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Rutcofsky: The Award of Attorneys' Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Ac

NOTES

THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER THE
EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Equal Access to Justice Act" (EAJA or the "Act") enacted
October 1, 19812, provides for the award of attorney's fees3 in certain suits involving the United States government. The EAJA was
passed in response to a congressional finding that certain parties,
particularly small businesses and individual businessmen, were deterred from pursuing their rights in opposition to unreasonable government action because of the expense involved.
The Act has two profound impacts on present law. First, it establishes a general statutory authorization for the award of attorney's fees in actions against the federal government where the government's position is not substantially justified.5 Although many
statutes8 have previously penetrated the veil of government immu1. Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. IV
1980) and 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (Supp. IV 1980)).
2. Id. § 208, 94 Stat. 2325, 2330 (1980).
3. The EAJA provides for the award of "fees and other expenses." 5 U.S.C. § 504
(a)(1)(Supp. IV 1980); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (Supp. IV 1980). As defined in the Act this
phrase includes "reasonable expenses of expert witnesses, the reasonable cost of any study,
. . . necessary for the. . . case, and reasonable attorney or agent fees. . . ." 5 U.S.C. § 504
(b)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1980); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(C)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1980). The limit on
attorney's fees is $75.00 per hour unless the agency or court determines that an increase in the
cost of living or a special factor justifies a higher fee. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(A) (Supp. IV
1980); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(C)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1980).
4. EAJA, Pub. L. No. 96-481 § 202(a), 94 Stat. 2325 (1980); see H.R. REP. No. 1418,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 4984, 4988 (The
award of attorney's fees was created primarily for "those individuals for whom cost may be a
deterrent to vindicating their rights.").
5. See 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (Supp. IV
1980).
6. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976); Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) amended by 28 U.S.C. § 2412
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nity, none has done so on such a grand scale.7 Second, the Act allows
courts to award attorney's fees against the government to the same
degree that it may grant fees against other parties. 8 Thus, the government becomes liable under the bad faith,9 common fund, 10 and
common benefit"' exceptions to the general American rule of
nonrecovery.' 2
This note briefly discusses the background of the EAJA and examines the debates prior to its passage,13 The Model Rules of the
14
Administrative Conference of the United States ("Model Rules"),
and case law in order to pinpoint and resolve problems in the Act's
interpretation. Because the Act is bifurcated and applies to both civil
and administrative cases, the discussion of eligible proceedings examines the civil and administrative contexts separately; the section
discussing eligible parties, however, looks at both contexts simultaneously. The Model Rules, promulgated to provide guidelines for
agency implementation of the Act, are frequently relied on in these
two sections. The note proceeds with a definition of a "prevailing
party," using standards established under other fee award statutes
that contain a similar requirement. Finally, the note concludes with
an analysis of the "substantially justified" standard based upon case
law and the Act's legislative history. The goal of this endeavor is to
(Supp. IV 1980); Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1619(b) (1976). The
complete list of attorney fee award statutes totals more than 100 separate authorizations for
fee awards against the government. See E.R. LARSON, FEDERAL COURT AWARDS OF ATTORNEY'S FEES, app. C (1981).
7. Other fee award statutes are limited to specific causes of action. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §
1988 (1976) (Civil Rights violations); 43 U.S.C. § 1619(b)(2) (1976) (Enforcement of native
land claims).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
9. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4984, 4987.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See infra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
13. Award of Attorneys' Fees Against the Federal Government: Hearings on S. 265
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the
House Judiciary Comm., 96th Cong. 2d Sess., (1980)[hereinafter cited as Hearings on the
Equal Access to Justice Act]; Equal Access to Courts: Hearings on S.2354 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1978).
14. 46 Fed. Reg. 32,900, 32,912 (1981). The Model Rules are the first step for agency
implementation of the EAJA, mandated by the statute. 5 U.S.C. § 504 (C)(1) (Supp. IV
1980). The Rules deal exclusively with administrative proceedings; they describe the parties
eligible for awards and the proceedings that are covered. They also explain how to apply for
awards and the procedures and standards that the agency will use to make them. See 46 Fed.
Reg. 32,912 (1981).
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establish guidelines for both practitioners and courts to determine
which proceedings and parties are eligible as well as the appropriate
standard for making an award under the EAJA.
II.

BACKGROUND

Under the American rule, litigants in American courts generally
are not awarded attorney's fees as part of their relief.15 The common
law, however, recognized two exceptions to this general prohibition
against fee shifting: the bad faith exclusion and the common fund or
common benefit exclusion. Where a party's position in litigation can
be characterized as vexatious, wanton or oppressive, the opposing

party may recover fees under the bad faith exception.16 The common
benefit or common fund exception applies where a prevailing litigant
has conferred a benefit upon a class of persons. A common example
of this is the benefit received by all shareholders in a corporation
when an individual shareholder successsfully pursues an action in the

name of that corporation. When such a benefit is conferred, the
court can award the successful litigant its attorney's fees and deduct
the amount, pro rata, from the damage awards made to the benefitting parties. 17 The fee-shifting operates to spread the costs proportionally among the beneficiaries. 18
These common law exceptions did not apply to the federal government prior to the enactment of the EAJA. 19 Many courts, how-

ever, awarded fees against the government in accordance with the
15. This is in contrast to the English or European Rule where attorney's fees are
awarded to the winning party. The rationale underlying the English rule is that fees are an
expense of litigation and should be borne by the losing party. See generally Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-71 (1975); Derfner, The True "American
Rule": Drafting Fee Legislation in the Public Interest, 2 WEST. NEw ENG. L. REv. 251
(1979); Note, Attorney Fees: Exceptions to the American Rule, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 717
(1976).
16. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975);
Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1962). For an example of the bad faith exception
to the award of attorney's fees see Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963). The
defendant refused, evaded and obstructed the plaintiff's desire to transfer and thereby desegregate the defendant's school. The defendant based its position on the plaintiff's alleged failure
to complete the transfer forms correctly. The court characterized this position as specious and
without merit. Id. at 498.
17. See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392-95 (1970).
18. Id. at 393-95. See also F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber
Co., 417 U.S. 116, 130 (1974); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 6 (1973); Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l
Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 167 (1939).
19. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
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"private attorney general theory,"20 which allowed plaintiffs to recover attorney's fees when litigation resulted in the enforcement of
an important societal right.21 In Alyeska Pipeline Services Co. v.
Wilderness Society,2 2 however, the Supreme Court struck down the
private attorney general theory as a violation of the rule that attorney's fees could not be awarded against the government absent specific statutory authorization.2"
In response, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976,24 allowing a prevailing
party to recover fees
25
from the government in a civil rights suit.
The EAJA represents the next major step in the erosion of the
federal government's immunity from the payment of the opposing
party's attorney's fees. The Act amends the United States Code,
codifies the common law exceptions,2" and supplies a general authorization to award attorney's fees against the government in civil
cases. 2 While the codification of the common law exceptions is permanent,2 81 the broader general authorization is, in effect, an experiment, since it is subject to automatic repeal. 29 The Act also adds a
new section to the Code that provides for potential governmental liability for fees in administrative proceedings.30
These statutory changes were enacted to encourage litigants to
20. Id.; see Note, supra note 15, at 733.
21. Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U.
PA. L. REv. 636, 669 (1974). The effectuation of an important societal right was the preeminent factor in determining whether the private attorney general theory was applicable. See
Id. at 666-70.
22. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
23. 421 U.S. at 267-68.
24. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1975) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976)
(amended 1981)).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) (amended 1981); see, e.g., Robinson v. Kimbrough, 620
F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1980); Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302, 1306 (9th Cir. 1980).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
27. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1980).
28. The codification of the common law exceptions is contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b)
(Supp. IV 1980) and is unaffected by the repeal provision. Pub. L. No. 96-481 § 204(c), 94
Stat. 2325, 2329 (1980)(repealing subsection (d) of § 2412 in 1984). The permanency of this
section reflects Congress' belief that, at a minimum, the federal government should be held to
the same standards as other parties. It should be noted that there are no financial eligibility
requirements under this section. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4984, 4996.
29. 5 U.S.C. § 504 is to be repealed on October 1, 1984. Pub. L. No. 96-481 § 203(c)
94 Stat. 2325, 2327 (1980); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) is also to be repealed on October 1, 1984.
Pub. L. No. 96-481 § 204(c), 94 Stat. 2325, 2329 (1980).
30. See 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
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vindicate their rights,31 to make litigation between the government
and business a fair fight,32 and to make agencies more accountable
for their actions.3 3 The EAJA seeks to effectuate these goals by reimbursing prevailing
parties for litigation costs with funds provided
34
government.
by the
III.

PROCEEDINGS COVERED

The Administrative Context.-The EAJA applies to adversarial adjudications3 5 governed by section 554 of Title 5 of the United States
37
Code, 36 where the position of the United States is represented.
Ratemaking and licensing procedures are explicitly excluded from
the scope of the Act. 38 Section 554 provides for procedural safeguards in certain hearings. 9 It, and consequently the EAJA, applies
to adjudications "required by statute to be determined on the record
after opportunity for an agency hearing."'4 0
The phrase "required by statute" has two meanings, both of
which have been the subject of litigation.4" First, the phrase has been
interpreted to mean those situations where constitutional, i.e., due
process, requirements mandate a hearing on the record.42 The precise articulation of this threshold has been elusive, but it is well established that where an interest protected by due process is challenged, a trial-type hearing must be convened. Second, specific
31.

H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &

AD. NEws 4984, 4984.
32.

126 CONG. REC. S13,690 (daily ed. September 26, 1980) (remarks of Sen.

DeConcini).
33. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4984, 4995.
34. The EAJA provides that the attorney's fees award should be made by the agency
over which the successful party prevails, if an appropriation is made to the agency for this
purpose. 5 U.S.C. § 504(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1980); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(4)(A) (Supp. IV 1980).
If an appropriation has not been made, then payment will be made through the General Ac-

counting
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Office as per 28 U.S.C. §§ 2414, 2517 (1976).
5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
5 U.S.C. § 554 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
5 U.S.C. § 504 (b)(1)(C) (Supp. IV 1980).
Id.
5 U.S.C. § 554(a)(1)-(a)(6) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
5 U.S.C. § 554 (Supp. IV 1980).

41. See Hercules, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 598 F.2d 91, 125 (D.C. Cir.
1978).
42. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49-50 (1950); see generally 2 K. C.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 12:1 (2d ed. 1979).
43. 2 K.C. DAvIs, supra note 42, § 12:2. The definition of what constitutes a sufficient
interest to warrant due process protection is beyond the scope of this article. For examples of
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statutes may require a formal hearing. Frequently, however, a statute will not indicate explicitly the type of hearing (formal or informal) required. As a result, the courts often make the determination
regarding the applicability of section 554.44 This reliance on judicial
decisions makes it difficult to predict which administrative proceedings will be eligible for the EAJA. To ease this task the Model Rules
require each agency to list categories of cases to which the Act applies.4 5 If a particular proceeding is not classified, the Rules recommend that the agency determine eligibility before the proceeding begins and provide notice of this determination to the parties.40
In compliance with these suggestions, many agencies have published lists of proceedings covered by the EAJA. 41 A party who disagrees with an agency's classification can either argue before the
agency or appeal to a federal district court. 4a Despite the categorization of specific proceedings by the agencies, there are still agency
actions where the coverage of the EAJA is uncertain. For example,
where eligible and ineligible actions are joined, the Model Rules
state that only the fees and expenses of the covered actions should be
awarded.4 9 If there is an overlap, the Rules suggest that the determination be left to the adjudicative officer, who is in the best position to
calculate an appropriate disbursement. 50
While the Act explicitly applies to those hearings required by
statute it is unclear whether it applies to formal hearings to which an
agency voluntarily submits. It is unwise to allow these discretionary
what has been held sufficient see, for example, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (suspension
from school for ten days invokes constitutional right to be heard); Willner v. Committee on
Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (denial of admission to the Bar is sufficient to invoke
constitutional protections).
44. See, e.g., Kirby v. Shaw, 358 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1966) (holding that 39 U.S.C. §
4005 (1976) required a formal hearing); North Amer. Van Lines, Inc. v. I.C.C., 386 F. Supp.
665 (N.D. Ind. 1974) (holding that 49 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1976) required a § 554 adjudication).
45.

46 Fed. Reg. 32,912

46.

Id. at § 0.103(b).

§

0.103(a) (1981).

47. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 24.103 (1981) (Department of Justice); 49 C.F.R. § 826.3
(1981) (National Transportation Safety Board); 46 Fed. Reg. 48,623, 48,624 (1981) (to be

codified at 5 C.F.R. § 2430.2) (Federal Labor Relations Authority); 46 Fed. Reg. 48,123
(1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 747.901) (National Credit Union Administration); 46
Fed. Reg. 51,377 (1981) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 373.4) (Civil Aeronautics Board); 46

Fed. Reg. 49,879 (1981) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. § 6.5) (Department of Transportation).
48,

46 Fed. Reg. 32,915 §§ 0.308, 0.309 (1981). Review by the federal courts is discre-

tionary. 5 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1980); H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 16,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4984, 4995.

49. 46 Fed. Reg. 32,912 § 103(c) (1981).
50.

Id. at 32,901.
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proceedings to fall within the scope of the Act, since this might discourage agencies from offering the formal proceedings. The Model
Rules avoid this potential hardship by exempting such proceedings
from the Act.51 This exception comports with the Act's purpose of
enhancing the availabiity of review procedures to an aggrieved party.
There is a second requirement for an agency proceeding to be
eligible under the EAJA-the position of the United States must be
represented.52 The mere presence of government counsel is not
enough-participation is required. The Model Rules define an eligible proceeding as one where an agency's position is "presented by an
attorney . . . who enters an appearance and participates in the proceeding. ' 53 The government's position, therefore, must be advocated
for the proceeding to be eligible for the award of attorney's fees.5

The Civil Context-The EAJA applies to all civil actions except
torts (although the Act does apply to constitutional torts) 55 and actions that fall within other fee award statutes. 56 The determination
of the eligibility of a civil action, therefore, focuses on the nature of
a plaintiffs cause of action. Accordingly, courts should use the same
modes of analysis that are employed in other situations where characterization of the cause of action is important.57 Where the nature
of a cause of action can be determined from the complaint, 5 the
court should inform the litigating party of its decision regarding the
eligibility of the action at the outset. To characterize the cause of
action the court may also consider the focus of the case as it develops during the litigation. 59 In this situation, the court should inform
the litigating parties of its eligibility decision at the earliest appropri51.

Id.

52. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(C) (Supp. IV 1980).
53. 46 Fed. Reg. 32,912 § 0.103(a) (1981) (emphasis added).
54. For example, in an administrative proceeding before the Social Security Administration (SSA) where a representative of the United States is present but remains neutral, the
EAJA is inapplicable. See H.R. REP.No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4984, 4991.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1980); H.R. REP.No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 18, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws 4984, 4997.
56. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4984, 4997. See supra note 6.
57. For example, a court may need to determine whether a cause of action is in contract
or tort for purposes of a statute of limitations or conflicts of law.
58. See, e.g., General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204, 1215-16 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1162 (1974); Stewart v. Shanahan, 277 F.2d 233, 236 (8th Cir.
1960).
59. Cf. Wolfe v. Continental Cas. Co., 647 F.2d 705, 709 (6th Cir. 1981) (This mode of
analysis may be useful when there are multiple causes of action).
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ate juncture.
The applicability of the EAJA to tax cases presents some interesting problems. The statute's failure to explicitly authorize coverage
of tax actions fosters an arbitrary rule: Tax cases tried before a federal district or appellate court are eligible for the award of attorney's
fees, 60 while actions tried in Tax Court are not.61 This disparate
treatment results from the legislators' failure to explicitly authorize
the inclusion of the Tax Court in the coverage of the EAJA. 2
The Tax Court is not eligible under the Act as an administrative body,6 3 nor is it eligible in the civil context. In McQuiston v.
Commissioner,"' the Tax Court concluded that it is not covered by
the EAJA as a civil proceeding because it does not fit under the
rubric of h "court" as defined by that Act.6 5 This result is contraindicated by the legislative history of the EAJA, which expressly
68
states that the internal revenue laws are intended to be covered.
Nonetheless, the position of the McQuiston court is well supported
and only legislative action could rectify the incongruity. Congress
has recognized this disparity 7 and there have been numerous at60. See Alspach v. District Director of Internal Revenue, 527 F. Supp. 225 (D. Md.
1981).
61. See McQuiston v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 807 (1982).
62. The legislative history, however, clearly states that cases involving the internal revenue laws are intended to be covered. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted
In 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4984, 4998.
63. See McQuiston v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 807 (1982); Nappi v. Commissioner, 58
T.C. 282 (1972).
64. 78 T.C. 807 (1982).
65. Id. at 811. According to the court in McQuiston the controlling definition of an
eligible court is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 451 (Supp. IV 1980). The McQuiston court relied on
Sharon v. Commisioner, 66 T.C. 515 (1976), aj/d, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. dened, 442 U.S. 941 (1979), where the Tax Court held that it was not statutorily authorized to
award costs. The Sharon holding was based on the language of 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1976)
which authorized the taxing of costs against the government pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920
(1976). § 1920 provides that "[a] judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax
... costs." Id. The definition of "court of the United States" is, in turn, supplied by 28
U.S.C. § 451 (1976):
The term "court of the United States" includes the Supreme Court of the United
States, courts of appeals, district courts . . . including the Court of Claims, the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the Customs Court and any court created by
Act of Congress the judges of which are entitled to hold office during good behavior.
Id. The Tax Court in Sharon held that it was not included in this definition. Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. at 533-34. Using this decision as precedent, the Court in McQuiston has
excluded Tax Courts from the EAJA.
66. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4984, 4998.
67. See 127 CONG. REc. H9616 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1981) (statement of Sen.
Kastenmeier).
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tempts to expand the coverage of the EAJA to encompass the Tax
Court. 8 As of this writing none of these efforts has reached fruition.
IV.

PARTIES COVERED

If the proceeding is covered, the EAJA employs a three-tier
analysis-using the same criteria for both civil and administrative
suits-to determine whether a litigant is eligible for an award. First,
any business, organization, or association must have less than 500
employees.69 Second, the party's net worth must be less than
$1,000,000 if the party is an individual, or less than $5,000,000 if
the party is a business.70 Tax exempt organizations 1 and cooperative
associations72 are not subject to the net worth requirement.7 3 These
74
two criteria must be satisfied as of the time the action is initiated.
Third, a litigant must be the prevailing party to be eligible for an
award of attorney's fees. 5
These criteria are intended to limit the application of the EAJA
to those parties who otherwise might be deterred from pursuing review because of the high cost of litigation." The net worth parameters were the subject of much controversy during the enactment of
the bill, because critics considered them to be too broad. 7
68. See, e.g., H.R. 4961, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
69. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1980); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (Supp. IV
1980).
70. See 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1980); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (Supp.
IV 1980).
71. Organizations described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26
U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976), are not subject to the net worth requirements. 5 U.S.C. §
504(b)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1980); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1980).
72. Organizations described in section 15(a) of the Agriculture Marketing Act, 12
U.S.C. § l141j(a) (1976), are not subject to the net worth requirements. 5 U.S.C. §
504(b)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1980); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1980).
73. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1980); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (Supp. IV
1980).
74. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1980); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (Supp. IV
1980).
75. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1980).
76. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprintedin 1980 U.S.
& AD. NEws 4984, 4994.

CODE

CONG.

77. The bill was criticized because some thought that the financial parameters would
make non-needy parties eligible. See Hearingson the Equal Access to JusticeAct, supra note
13, at 79 (statement of Mary Frances Derfner); id. at 91(statement of Nancy Drabble). But
see id. at 36 (statement of Sen. Sawyer). See also Equal Access to Courts: Hearings on
S.2354 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 32-33 (1978) (statement of Paul Nejelski, Department
of Justice) (the Equal Access to Courts Act employed the same financial parameters as the
EAJA).
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Net Worth.-Net worth of a party is calculated by subtracting total
liabilities from total assets.78 The House Report suggests that assets
be valued at the cost of acquisition rather than replacement value.7
The Model Rules interpreted this as a manifestation of congressional
intent to permit low valuation, and accordingly provide for the use of
the lower of either fair market (replacement) value or acquisition
cost.80 This choice contemplates a situation where an asset has decreased in value and fair market value remains lower than acquisition cost.81 The Model Rules point out that where a party obviously
is eligible the means of evaluation will be inapposite, but in a close
case agencies, and presumably the courts as well, 2 should take into
account the reference to acquisition cost, found in the EAJA's legislative history.83
The valuation of a business with affiliates calls for special treatment. The net worth of all affiliates-defined as any entity in which
the applicant has a majority interest--is added to that of the applicant to determine eligibility" unless the adjudicative officer concludes that the aggregation would be unjust or contrary to the purposes of the Act.8
The eligibility of a sole owner of an unincorporated business is
determined by the nature of the issues on which the litigant
prevails.8 7 If the issues arise out of his personal business, the litigant
will be subject to the $1,000,000 threshold; if they arise from his
commercial dealings, the $5,000,000 net worth interface will apply.88
In the latter case, both personal and business assets will be cumulated to determine his eligibility.8 '
Participation by representative parties increases the difficulty of
78. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4984, 4994.
79. See Id.
80. 46 Fed. Reg. 32,907 (1981).
81. Id.
82. No counterpart of the Model Rules, which apply only to administrative proceedings,
has been promulgated for the civil context. This note suggests that the guidelines for net worth
and employee quantitation contained in the Model Rules be utilized in the civil context.
83. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4984, 4994 ("In determining the value of assets, the cost of acquisition rather
than fair market value should be used.").
84. 46 Fed. Reg. 32,912 § 0.104(0 (1981).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. § 0.104(d).
88. See Id.
89. See Id. § 0.104(b)(2).
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implementing the financial criteria. The treatment of trade associations raises some interesting questions. The Model Rules state that
"[a]n applicant that participates in a proceeding primarily on behalf
of one or more persons or entities that would be ineligible is not itself
eligible for an award."90 Rather than aggregating the net worth of
all members, the Rules advocate individual consideration of each
member; 91 associations with ineligible members are not eligible for
the Act. 2 If the association represents a discrete group of members,
as would be the case, for example, where only a few members of the
National Jewelers Association were affected by an OSHA regula93
tion, then only those businesses' net worth should be aggregated.
Whether this methodology applies to groups such as lobbying organizations or merchant's associations is unanswered. Naturally, trade
associations or any other representative group may act on their own
behalf-for example, as employers. If so, their eligibility should be
94
measured irrespective of their membership.
The documentation required of an applicant may be submitted
in any manner that fully discloses net worth,95 including a tax or
loan form. The adjudicative officer or judge may also require additional information if an initial application is incomplete.96
Employees.-The second tier of the eligibility test excludes any business, organization, or cooperative that has more than 500 employees.97 The Model Rules define employees as "all persons who regularly perform services for remuneration for the applicant, under the
applicant's direction and control. Part-time employees shall be included on a proportional basis."9 8 This definition, which incorporates
the concept of control, may include employees of contractors. 9 Be90. Id. § 0.104(g).
91. Id. at 32,903.
92. Id. at 32,913 § 0.104(g).
93. Id. at 32,903.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 32,913 § 0.202(a). But see infra notes 71-73 (Tax-exempt and cooperative
organizations are exempt from the net worth parameters). As a matter of course, financial
disclosure statements are made part of the record of a proceeding. This practice may deter
some parties from availing themselves of the Act. Unless the party can make the showing that
as a matter of law, the disclosure should not be made, it will become part of the official record.
46 Fed. Reg. 32,913-14 § 0.202(b) (1981).
96. 46 Fed. Reg. 32,913 § 0.202(a) (1981).
97. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1980); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (Supp. IV
1980).
98. 46 Fed. Reg. 32,912 § 0.104(e) (1981).
99. Id. at 32,902.
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cause temporary or seasonal workers are excluded,1"' businesses that
consistently hire temporary or seasonal workers, such as farms,
seemingly are given an unfair unadvantage. A better rule would include these workers on a pro-rated basis. 101
As in the calculation of net worth, the amount of control that an
applicant exerts over a subsidiary determines whether the employees
of the applicant and the subsidiary will be aggregated. If the related
business is an affiliate-again defined as an organization in which
the applicant has greater than 50% control-all of its employees are
included.102 If an applicant has a non-majority holding, none of the
affiliate's employees are counted.103
To assist parties confronted with the application of these difficult criteria, the Model Rules request agencies that frequently deal
with problematic situations to issue guidelines that clarify the manner in which the total number of employees is calculated. 10' Similar
guidelines are not available in the civil context, and courts might be
wise to utilize the relevant agency guidelines to aid in their determination regarding civil proceedings.
PrevailingParties.-Thethird qualification requires the applicant to
be the prevailing party.10 5 The House Report states that the interpretation of this phrase should follow case law established under
other fee award statutes.108 Under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act,107 for example, eligibility as a prevailing party does not
require complete success.1° 8 The test articulated by the First Circuit
in Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 09 and subsequently followed by most other
100. Id.
101. This suggested analysis may go beyond the statutory mandate of determining the
number of employees at the time the suit is initiated. By excluding seasonal and temporary
workers, the Model Rules allow for inequitable manipulation by applicants who may file a suit
at a time when their employee total is deceptively low. One solution might be for a judge to
deny recovery of fees to an otherwise eligible party under the special circumstances exception.
See Infra text accompanying notes 179-85.
102. 46 Fed. Reg. 32,902-03 (1981).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 32,902.
105. See 5 U.S.C. § 504 (a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980); 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2)(1)(B) (Supp. IV
1980).
106. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4984, 4990.
107, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. IV 1980).
108. Larson, Attorney's Fees Under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976, 15 CLEARINGHOUSE Ruv. 309, 313 (1981).
109. 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978).
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courts,110 defines a prevailing party as one who has succeeded on any
significant issue in litigation, thus achieving some of the benefit it
sought. "1 For example, in Gagne v. Maher,112 the Supreme Court
affirmed the prevailing party status of a litigant who, while not prevailing on every claim, had achieved substantially all the relief it had
originally sought.113
A party will be deemed prevailing, regardless of the procedural
mechanism used to achieve victory, if he has vindicated some of his
rights. " 4 Thus, a prevailing party is one who has obtained relief
through a settlement,115 a consent decree, " a preliminary injunction,1 17 or through state administrative proceedings.118
Although the method of success is unimportant, the litigant's
action must be causally related to the relief obtained. In Chicano
Police Officer's Association v. Stover,119 the court held that "plaintiff's conduct, as a practical matter, must have played a significant
role in achieving the objective. 1 20 The litigation itself must be the
catalyst for the change in the agency's action or position. Similarly,
the causal relation between the litigation and the desired result must
exist in a civil litigation. Unlike the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act,1 21 which imposes a higher burden on defendants than
plantiffs, 22 the EAJA does not differentiate between the two. There110. Almost every circuit has recognized the Nadeau holding. See, e.g., Gagne v.
Maher, 594 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1979), afrd, 448 U.S. 122 (1980); Bagby v. Beal, 606 F.2d 411

(3d Cir. 1979); Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1979); Ramos v. Koebig, 638 F.2d
838 (5th Cir. 1981); Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
447 U.S. 911 (1980); Dawson v. Pastrick, 600 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1979); Kimbrough v. Arkansas Activities Ass'n, 574 F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1978); Sethy v. Alameda County Water District,
602 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1046 (1980); Chicano Police Officer's

Ass'n v. Stover, 624 F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1980).
111. Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (lst Cir. 1978).
112.

448 U.S. 122 (1980).

113.

Id. at 130.

114.

See Larson, supra note 108, at 313.

115. Chicano Police Officer's Ass'n v. Stover, 624 F.2d 127, 130-31 (10th Cir. 1980).
116.

Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336, 339-40 (2d Cir. 1979), arid, 448 U.S. 122 (1980).

117. Williams v. Alioto, 625 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1723
(1981).

118. New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 61-66 (1980).
119.

624 F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1980).

120. Id. at 131.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. IV 1980).
122.

The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 allows prevailing party-

plaintiffs to recover fees as a matter of course. See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., 390
U.S. 400, 401-02 (1968) (Newman dealt with the award of attorney's fees under the predeces-

sor to the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act). Prevailing party-defendants, however, are
required to show frivolous, unreasonable or groundless action on the plaintiff's part in order to
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fore, any eligible party who has achieved some success is likely to be
deemed prevailing.
V.

SUBSTANTIALLY

JUSTIFIED

If a party meets the economic criteria of the Act, 23 and is a
prevailing party, 124 attorney's fees will be awarded "unless the position of [the government] was substantially justified or that special
circumstances make an award unjust."'' 25 This standard represents
the burden of proof that the government must bear to avoid liability
under the statute. The standard has three component parts: (1) "position of the government;" (2) "substantially justified;" and (3) "special circumstances."
"Position of the Government."-Neither the legislative history of

the EAJA nor the statute itself articulates which position of the government must be justified. The House Report and Senate Hearings
on the Act are rife with ambiguous references, some pointing to the
conclusion that only the litigation position need be justified, 26 and
others indicating that the drafters intended that the government justify its underlying actions. 27 As a result of the ambiguity, courts
have been unable to agree on the subject. Some courts have concluded that only the government's position in litigation need be scrurecover attorney's fees. See, e.g., Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 417-22
(1978) (Chrlstlanburg dealt with the award of attorney's fees under the predecessor to the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act).
123. See supra text accompanying notes 73-104.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 105-21.
125. See 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (Supp. IV
1980).
126. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4984, 4989 ("Where the Government can show that its case had a
reasonable basis both in law and fact, no award will be made") (emphasis added); id. at 11,
reprinted In 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 4984, 4989 ("certain types of case dispostions may indicate that the Government action was not substantially justified") (emphasis
added); Id. at 22, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4984, 5011 (certain
dispositions indicate that the "Government was not substantially justified in pursuing the
litigation").
127. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4984, 4993 (the standard "presses the agency to address the problem of abusive and harassing regulatory practices."); Hearingson the EqualAccess to Justice
Act, supra note 13, at 25 ("[M]any citizens today have no effective remedy against unreasonable government regulation.") (statement of Sen. DeConcini); id. ("We must give citizens at
least a fighting chance to challenge the unreasonable exercise of governmental power") (statement of Sen. DeConcini); id. at 16 ("Individuals and small businesses are in far too many
cases forced to knuckle under to regulations even though they have a direct and substantial
impact because they cannot afford the adjudication process.") (statement of Sen. Domenici).
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tinized, 28 while others have held that both the underlying actions
and the litigation position must be examined.1 29 The contradictory
results apparently are irreconcilable, with each camp able to muster
support for its position. The underlying policy of the Act-to en-courage litigants to pursue their rights and to discourage the government from pursuing unbased claims 1 3 -- supports the view that the
government should justify both the litigation position and the underlying action. Otherwise the government could continue to promulgate and enforce arbitrary regulations only to capitulate when served
with a complaint. Under the interpretation that requires justification
of only the litigation provision, this scenario would constitute justified behavior because the government did nothing unreasonable in
the litigation. The beleaguered party would still be harassed but
would be unable to collect attorney's fees.""1 Such a result would be
clearly contrary to the spirit and purposes of the Act." 2
"Substantially Justifled."-The phrase "substantially justified" was
adopted13 3 from the language of Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 3 4 and was chosen to place the burden of justifying
its position on the government. 3 5 It is a test of reasonableness in fact
128. See, e.g., S & H Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev.
Comm., 672 F.2d 426, 430 (5th Cir. 1982) (focusing on the government's justification in litigation); Operating Eng'rs Local Union No. 3 v. Bohn, 541 F. Supp. 486, 493-95 (D. Utah
1982) (relying on the purpose of the Act in determining that only the litigation position of the
government need be justified); Alspach v. District Director of Internal Revenue, 527 F. Supp.
225, 228 (D. Md. 1981) (stating that the "question is a close one").
129. See, e.g., Nunes-Correia v. Haig, C.A. No. 74-280 (D.D.C. July 13, 1982) (available on LEXIS, Genfed Library, Cases file); Constantino v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 60, 61
(E.D. Penn. 1981) (the government contended that its position in withholding the plaintiff's
refund check was justified); Wolverton v. Schweiker, 533 F. Supp. 420, 425 (D. Idaho 1982)
(government was not justified in withholding disability checks); Photo Data, Inc. v. Sawyer,
533 F. Supp. 348, 352 (D.D.C. 1982) (government's rejection of plaintiff's low bid was not
substantially justified); Spang v. United States, 533 F. Supp. 220, 226 (W.D. Okla. 1982)
(government never presented plaintiff with specific findings of fact on which the proposed assessment was based.).
130. See EAJA, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 202(a), 94 Stat. 2325, 2325 (1980); Photo Data,
Inc. v. Sawyer, 533 F. Supp. 348, 352 n.7. See also supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., Operating Eng'rs Local Union No. 3 v. Bohn, 541 F. Supp. 486, 495 (D.
Utah 1982). The court held that the government did not have to pay attorney's fees because its
litigation position, capitulating nine days after the service of the complaint, was justified).
132. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
133. SEE H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4984, 4992.
134. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4).
135. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4984, 4992.
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and law. 1 36 While a clear definition of reasonableness is difficult, the
endeavor is aided by examining the House Report, 3 7 the Hearings
prior to the passage of the EAJA, 36 and cases decided under Rule
37.139 The cases that have interpreted the EAJA have employed
these sources in their attempt to comprehend the meaning of "substantially justified."
The House Report, 140 by way of example, states that certain
case dispositions may indicate that the government's position was not
substantially justified. These include a judgment on the pleadings, 141
a directed verdict,1 42 or where a prior suit on the same claim had
been dismissed.1 43 In addition, the House Conference Report 44 suggests that where there is a significant difference between the government's original complaint and the amount or content of a negotiated
settlement the government's position may not be substantially justified.1 45 Thus, the House Conference Report distinguishes between
cases that go through a full trial and those that are ended by a
facesaving agreement on behalf of the government. These examples,
while useful, do not raise a presumption that the government acted
unreasonably;1 46 nor does the mere loss of a suit raise a presumption
against governmental reasonableness. 1 47 The standard does not require the government to have had a "substantial probability of prevailing"1 48 although logically the government should demonstrate
that it had some chance of prevailing.
Another factor that clarifies the substantially justified standard
136. Id. at 13, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws 4984, 4992.
137. Id.; H.R. REP. CONF. No. 1434, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprintedin 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5003, 5011.
138. Hearings on the Equal Access to Justice Act, supra note 13; Equal Access to
Courts: Hearings on S. 2354 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in JudicialMachinery
of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as Hearingson
the Equal Access to Courts Act].
139. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). See infra notes 164-72 and accompanying text.

140. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4984, 4989.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4984, 4989-90.
144. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1434, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5003, 5003.

145.
146.

Id. at 22, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5003, 5011.
H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.-

& AD. NEWS 4984, 4989-90.
147.

Id., reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4984, 4990.

148.

Id.
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is the length of the proceeding. 149 The House Report specifically indicates that where a party has submitted to a lengthy administrative
procedure and then additionally resorts to judicial review to vindicate his rights, the government must make a "strong showing" that
its position was substantially justified. 1 0° This additional burden
should apply to any lengthy administrative or judicial procedure regardless of whether appellate review of the procedure is sought. Implementing the "strong showing" requirement in any lengthy action
aligns with one of the purposes of the Act, i.e., requiring the government to account for time and money spent on litigation. The more
stringent showing apparently rests on the premise that the greater
the expenditure of government funds, the greater the need to make
agencies more accountable.
The House Report contains another formulation that is useful in
ascertaining the meaning of substantially justified: "The standard
and burden of proof adopted . . . represents an acceptable middle
ground between an automatic award of fees and the restrictive standard [of requiring a showing of arbitrary and frivolous action]. "5'
This statement evolved from the various proposals that the House
and Senate Committees considered and rejected. The Equal Access
to Courts Act' 52 would have authorized an automatic award to prevailing parties 153 but this authorization was considered to be too lenient.1' " House Resolution 5342155 applied a more stringent standard
that would have required the government to show that its position
was "clearly justified" to avoid an award of attorney's fees.156 House
Resolution 7208157 advocated that awards be made only if a court or
149.

Id. at 18, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4984, 4997.

150. Id.
151. Id. at 14, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4984, 4993. See H.R.
7208, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprintedin Hearingson the Equal Access to JusticeAct,
supra note 138, at 181. H.R. 7208 was introduced by Sen. Rodino at the request of the Justice
Department. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4984, 4985.
152. S. 2354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in Hearings on the Equal Access

to Courts Act, supra note 138, at 3.
153. S. 2354 1(c)(1), 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprintedin Hearings on the Equal
Access to Courts Act, supra note 138, at 4.
154. Hearings on the Equal Access to Courts Act, supra note 138, at 31 (testimony of

Paul Nejelski, Department of Justice).
155. H.R. 5342, 96th Cong., 1st Sass. (1977), reprintedin Hearingson the Equal Access to Justice Act, supra note 13, at 142.

156. H.R. 5342 § 3(a), 96th Cong. 1st Sss. (1977), reprintedin Hearingson the Equal
Acces to Justice Act, supra note 13, at 144.

157. H.R. 7208, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in Hearings on the Equal Ac-
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agency found that the government's position was "arbitrary, frivolous, unreasonable or groundless, or that the [government] continued
to proceed after its position clearly became so. '' 158 In addition, the
Senate Committee considered a proposal to adopt the language "reasonably justified." 159 All of these proposals were discarded in favor
of substantially justified, and the selection of this phrase becomes
significant when one considers the large number of alternative standards available to the drafters of the EAJA. The definition that can
be gleaned from the rejected proposals is that a substantially justified position lies somewhere between those that are reasonably justified and those that are clearly justified. The distinction between reasonably and substantially justified has frequently been utilized in the
cases construing the EAJA.16 0 The use of such an abstract definition,
however, is not very helpful in ascertaining the meaning of substantially justified and a more practical formulation can be derived from
the cases decided under Rule 37(a)(4). 16 '
These cases enumerate examples of judicial application of an
identically worded standard as that contained in the EAJA. Rule
37(a)(4) states that the court shall award attorney's fees for a motion compelling discovery unless the opposing party's position is substantially justified. 162 The Committee Notes indicate that a party's
position is substantailly justified when there is a genuine dispute. 63
In Palma v. Lake Waukomis Development Co., " the defendant refused to answer certain questions at a deposition based on a
claim of privilege involving intercorporate communication. The defendant cited two cases to support its proposition, which the court
found to be inapplicable.165 Since no other support was mustered for
the defendant's position the court held that the defendant was not
substantially justified in refusing to answer the interrogatory. 166 Accordingly, the court awarded the plaintiff the expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred in obtaining the motion to compel
cess to Justice Act, supra note 13, at 181.
158. H.R. 7208 § 102(a), 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in Hearings on the
Equal Access to Justice Act, supra note 13, at 182.
159. See Hearingson the Equal Access to Justice Act, supra note 13, at 37-38.
160. See cases cited supra notes 128-29.

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4).
Id.
Id.
48 F.R.D. 366 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
Id. at 368.
Id. at 369.
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discovery. 6 7
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Los Alamos
Constructors, Inc.,16 8 the EEOC refused to answer interrogatories,
claiming governmental immunity and informer's privilege. The court
characterized the claim of informer's privilege as a "red herring."1 9
More significantly, the court held the EEOC's claim of governmental
immunity to be contrary to a long line of authority. 70 In dicta, the
court indicated that, had it been able to do so, it would have
awarded attorney's fees to Los Alamos.17 1 It would appear that
under Rule 37(a)(4) a substantially justified position must at least
be one that is consonant with prior case law.
Some of the cases construing the EAJA have adopted this
guideline in determining whether the government's position was substantially justified. In United States for Heydt v. Citizens State
Bank,17 2 the court indicated that the plaintiff's conformance with
prior decisions in deciding to issue a summons constituted substantial
justification. 17 3 Alternatively, in Berman v. Schweiker,17 4 where the
government's position was not based on prior case law, the court
1 75
characterized its position as being "erroneous as a matter of law."
While a great deal of attention and legislative effort went into
selecting the standard for making an award of attorney's fees, the
legislators efforts are being undermined. Legislative history suggests
that the determinative issue was meant to be the substantial justification of the government's position. The ambiguity of the statute,
however, has allowed a different question to become dispositive:
Must the government's underlying actions meet the criterion-or
only its litigation position? It is the judicial answer to this question
167. Id.
168.

382 F. Supp. 1373 (D. N. Mex. 1974).

169. Id. at 1383.
170. Id. For the discussion of the judicial precedents on the claim of governmental immunity see id. at 1375-83.
171. In 1974, FED. R. Civ. P. 37(f) exempted the government from the award of attorney's fees; 37(f) has been repealed by the EAJA. Pub. L. No. 96-481 § 25(a), 94 Stat. 2325,
2330 (1980).
172. 668 F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1982).
173. Id. at 448. See Citizens Coalition for Block Grant Compliance v. City of Euclid,
537 F. Supp. 422, 426 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (court found that HUD's initial opposition to the suit
based on a standing argument was based on case law that was good precedent at the time the
suit was initiated. An intervening decision by the Supreme Court altered the law; consequently
HUD entered into a settlement agreement. The court held that HUD's original reliance on
good case law constituted substantial justification).
174. 531 F. Supp. 1149 (N.D. I1. 1982).
175. Id. at 1154.
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that has come to control; the cases holding that only the government's litigation position need be justified do not make an award of
attorney's fees, 171 while those concentrating on the government's underlying actions impose the liability of the EAJA. 177 Although Congress did not intend the award of attorney's fees to hinge on this
determination, the effect has been inconsequential as there has been
a near even split of the courts on this issue.
Even in the event the court finds that the government was not
substantially justified the government may not have to pay attorney's
fees if the court finds that there8 are "special circumstances [that
17
would] make an award unjust.1
"Special Circumstances."-This'phrase,in effect, is a "safety valve"
and has at least two purposes. First, it functions as a limit on the
"chilling effect" that the EAJA could have on government enforcement efforts since novel, creative and credible methods 79 of prosecution were not intended to be drawn into the purview of the Act.18 0
Second, the phrase also adopts the equitable considerations present
in other fee award statutes 81 that prevent the payment of attorney's
fees, where, for example, the award-seeking party has unnecessarily
protracted the controversy or otherwise has acted unreasonably in
the litigation. 2 The special circumstances exception also might be
used to deny the benefits of the Act to any party that has manipulated data in order to bring itself within the eligibility requirements.
This safety valve is likely to be the cynosure of litigation as it
creates broad judicial discretion. It should be noted, however, that
the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976183 has been
interpreted to contain a similar exception,l although it has been
invoked only once. 185 The explicit incorporation of this exception into
the EAJA, however, assures that its scope will assume a more promi176.

Id. The court referred to its original decision, No. 80 C 2737 (N.D. Il1. Aug. 14,

1981), where it held that the Social Security Administration's position was contrary to numerous case decisions. The court granted a summary judgment to the plaintiffs.
177. See sources cited supra note 137.
178.

See 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (Supp. IV

1980).
179. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE
& AD. NEws 4984, 4990.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 13, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws 4984, 4992.
183. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. IV 1980).
184. Larson, supra note 108, at 314.
185. See Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 541 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1976).
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nent role in litigation.
In summary, the EAJA requires the government to show that
its position is substantially justified. A number of factors, including
the type of case disposition, or the quality of the settlement, or the
length of the proceeding may indicate the reasonableness of the government's position. In addition, the various proposals that were rejected and the cases decided under Rule 37 and the EAJA aid further in the definition of the standard.
CONCLUSION

The EAJA, by providing for the award of attorney's fees
against the government, represents an ambitious effort by Congress
to balance the litigational resources between the government and
small businesses and individuals. To encourage parties to pursue
their rights, the Act has both liberal eligibility requirements and an
anti-government bias for awarding of attorney's fees. The recovery of
attorney's fees is by no means certain and, in this sense, litigation
against the government is a gamble, with the odds in favor of the
private party. While a statute making mandatory awards of attorney's fees to prevailing parties might have provided a greater incentive to litigants, the conditional award of the EAJA is an effective
compromise. This compromise will minimize the incidence of barratry that any fee award provision may promote, and will not subject
the government to an inequitable burden. It remains to be seen
whether this bias will encourage litigants to fight rather than comply
with an unreasonable regulation or other government action. 188
The effectuation of the secondary goal of the EAJA--curbing
abusive agency action-is also in question. The imposition of, in effect, a sanction on the agencies by making them liable for awards
charged against them is a circuitous method of relaying the message
that Congress is dissatisfied with their enforcement efforts. Although
this may prove to be a successful technique, a more direct statement
of Congressional discontent with agency regulatory practices may
have been more efficacious in correcting the situation.
Perhaps the greatest shortcoming of the EAJA is the lack of
186. One of the more perplexing aspects of the Act is its relative anonymity. Despite the
noteworthiness of the statute relatively few actions have been initiated under it. In fact, the

original congressional estimate on the cost of the Act was $92,000,000, H.R. REP. No. 1418,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 21, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4984, 5000, while

the actual costs of the bill during the first nine months of its enactment were less than
$1,000,000. Nat'l Law Journal, Oct. 18, 1982, at 8, col.2.
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guidelines for implementing the Act into civil litigation. This oversight is particularly egregious in light of the comprehensive guidelines established for administrative proceedings. A further inadequacy is the failure to explicitly define the standards for which an
award should be made. Nonetheless, the EAJA represents a major
step toward reducing the vulnerability of individuals and businesses
to unreasonable government attack by providing these entities with
the means to fight back.
Barry S. Rutcofsky
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